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Abstract: This paper aims at discovering the decision rule the Governing Council of the ECB 
uses to set interest rates. We construct a Taylor rule for each member of the council and for 
the euro area as a whole, and aggregate the interest rates they produce using several classes of 
decision-making mechanisms: chairman dominance, bargaining, consensus, voting, and 
voting with a chairman. We test alternative scenarios in which individual members of the 
council pursue either a national or a federal objective. We then compare the interest-rate path 
predicted by each scenario with the observed euro area’s interest rate. We find that scenarios 
in which all members of the Governing Council are assumed to pursue Euro-area-wide 
objectives are dominated by scenarios in which decisions are made collectively by a council 
consisting of members pursuing national objectives. The best-performing scenario is the one 
in which individual members of the Governing Council follow national objectives, bargain 
over the interest rate, and their weights are based on their country’s share of the zone’s GDP. 
 
Keywords: European Central Bank, Monetary Policy Committee, Decision rules. 
JEL classification: D70, E43, E58, F33. 
 
Acknowledgments: We thank Edith Neuenkirch, Matthias Neuenkirch, Florian Neumeier, 
Britta Niehof, Matthias Uhl, and participants of a research seminar at the Universidade de 
Minho  and the Silvaplana Workshop in Political Economy for helpful comments. The 
responsibility for any remaining errors or shortcomings is entirely our own, although we have 
yet to agree on their distribution between us. 2 
 
1. Introduction 
Like most other central banks, the European Central Bank (ECB) sets monetary policy in the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) based on decisions made by a monetary policy committee. 
Decisions in the ECB are made by the Governing Council, which consists of the central bank 
governors of member countries, who are appointed by their respective governments, and the 
six members of the European Central Bank (ECB) Executive Board, who are appointed by the 
European Council. 
As with any committee, individual members of the Governing Council may disagree 
on monetary policy decisions. The committee members may have different information about 
the state of the economy, employ different economic models, and come from different 
personal backgrounds, resulting in different views about appropriate adequate policy. For 
instance, Gerlach-Kristen (2003), Spencer (2006), Bhattacharjee and Holly (2006), and 
Besley et al. (2008) show that different personal backgrounds have an effect on the positions 
taken by members of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. 
Most of all, in a federally organised central bank like the ECB preferred policy choices 
of Governing Council members may differ because they represent different countries, with 
different business cycles and different economic problems (Berger and de Haan, 2002). 
Similar differences have been documented for the Federal Reserve Bank’s (Fed) Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) by Gildea (1992), Meade and Sheets (2005), and Chappell 
et al. (2008). Gildea (1992) finds that unemployment rates in the regions represented by the 
Fed presidents help predict their votes in the FOMC. Meade and Sheets (2005) reach similar 
conclusions, not just for regional Fed presidents but also for members of the Board of 
Governors, who are supposed to represent only federal interests. 
It appears likely that regional interests will play a role in a monetary union such as the 
EMU, which is relatively new and consists of largely autonomous states. Yet, the ECB’s 
Governing Council has never openly acknowledged such disagreements. On the contrary, it 
officially always reaches decisions by consensus (see ECB press statements). Nevertheless, 
voting is explicitly envisaged in Article 10.2 of the statutes of the European System of Central 
Banks and of the European Central Bank. To cope with the forthcoming enlargement of the 3 
 
union and the ensuing increased size of the Governing Council, a new rotation principle 
designed to replace simple majority voting was developed in 2003 and ratified by EMU 
member countries in 2004. Originally, this principle was to be put into practice when the 
EMU increased to 15 members. Interestingly, even before this 15-member threshold was met, 
the rotation principle was amended (in 2009) and is now specified to come into force when 
the number of EMU member countries reaches 18. Thus, there appears to be a certain 
reluctance to abandon the one-country–one-vote principle, suggesting that member countries 
fear that monetary policy may be less fitting to their needs when they can no longer cast a 
vote. In spite of these considerations, the official position of the ECB is that the members of 
the council have never resorted to voting to make a decision. However, if consensus is indeed 
the only way decisions are made, voting rules would be irrelevant—and there would be no 
need to change them. Also, it seems a bit doubtful that the Governing Council can avoid 
voting, considering that so many other monetary policy committees (MPCs) do: Fry et 
al. (2000) state that 36 out of the 88 central banks in their sample use formal voting in making 
decisions. 
Additional doubt is raised by the fact that unlike other central banks, the ECB does not 
publish minutes of Governing Council meetings. Thus, disagreements, if any, are hidden 
behind a diplomatic veil. It is thus impossible for outsiders to observe disagreements among 
Governing Council members, or how such likely disagreements are overcome. In fact, the 
ECB does not even reveal the actual decision mechanism that it uses to reach decisions. 
Nevertheless, a large body of theoretical contributions emphasises the importance of 
the decision rule used by monetary policy committees because the chosen decision rule 
determines the extent to which asymmetric national characteristics are considered in federal 
monetary policy. Some contributions consider differences in preferences, in the structure of 
member economics, or in shocks. For instance, Alesina and Grilli (1992), Montoro (2007), 
and Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010) focus on differences in inflation aversion among 
committee members. Aksoy et al. (2002), Hefeker (2003), and Arnold (2006) emphasise 
structural differences across countries. Others, such as von Hagen and Süppel (1994), Gros 
and Hefeker (2002), Grüner and Kiel (2004), Matsen and Røisland (2005), Fatum (2006), and 
Farvaque et al. (2009), look at differences in shocks across member countries. The common 4 
 
message of these papers is that decision rules in MPCs matter, especially in a federal 
monetary union. 
However, our knowledge of the actual decision-making mechanisms used by the ECB 
lags far behind the sophistication of theoretical contributions. As no information is published 
about Governing Council debates, its decisions are analysed from an aggregate, namely, 
federal, point of view. Accordingly, most researchers study the ECB’s monetary policy by 
estimating interest-rate reaction functions or Taylor rules, relating the economic situation of 
the euro area to observed interest rates. A number of studies estimate such an aggregate 
reaction function for the euro area (Gerlach and Schnabel, 2000, Mihov, 2001, Doménech et 
al., 2002, Fourçans and Vranceanu, 2004, Gerdesmeier and Roffia, 2004, Clausen and Hayo, 
2005, Hayo and Hofmann, 2006, Gerlach, 2007). These studies differ substantially in terms of 
theoretical assumptions, empirical implementation, and, perhaps not surprisingly, results. 
Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010) adopt a slightly different perspective by also studying the 
aggregate evolution of interest rates set by five central banks, including the ECB, but their 
aim is to determine the decision rule they use. They report that the consensus model, i.e., 
where no member has proposal power and a ‘super-majority’ is required for a policy change, 
fits actual policy decisions better than the alternative models. A major drawback of Riboni 
and Ruge-Murcia’s (2010) approach is that they do not describe the institutional details of 
decision making in the euro area. First, they overlook the evolution of the Executive Board 
and do not adjust its size after Greece joined. Second, and even more importantly, their 
approach does not take into account the federal nature of the ECB. In Riboni and Ruge-
Murcia’s (2010) setting, members of the monetary policy committee disagree because their 
relative weights on inflation and output differ, but they all base their decisions on the euro 
area’s aggregate evolution, without any specific consideration of their home country’s 
economic situation. 
Some contributions consider the connection between national interests and ECB 
policy, generally with a focus on whether the ECB looks at aggregate euro area only, or may 
also cater to the needs of particular countries. Heinemann and Huefner (2004) find that 
regional divergences help explain ECB interest-rate decisions, which suggests that the 
Governing Council does not look only at aggregate data. Other studies find similar evidence 5 
 
and suggest that the ECB places a disproportionately high weight on economic conditions in 
the bigger EMU member countries, particularly France and Germany (von Hagen and 
Brückner, 2001, Kool, 2006). In contrast to these findings, which are based on data from the 
early phase of EMU, Sturm and Wollmershäuser (2008) report that economic conditions in 
small member countries receive more than proportional weights in actual ECB monetary 
policy decisions. Sousa (2009) assumes that national representatives on the  Governing 
Council take into account national perspectives when they vote on interest-rate decisions, and 
discovers evidence that voting coalitions are likely. He argues, however, that the current 
strong strategic position of the Executive Board is sufficient to prevent such coalitions from 
actually having any effect on monetary policy. Finally, Bénassy-Quéré and Turkish (2009) 
consider the aggregation of national interests within the Governing Council. They estimate the 
counterfactual optimal interest rates that would be set by member countries under autonomous 
monetary policy using a priori  postulated national Taylor rules to simulate the ECB’s 
interest-rate path implied by its new rotating decision-making system. However, they cannot 
compare simulated interest rates to actual ones because their study is a counterfactual of a 
mechanism that, so far, has not been implemented. Therefore, their analysis does not tell us 
anything about the status quo of decision making in the Governing Council but instead 
analyses what its policy would look like if the ECB used the rotation system. 
This paper uses a novel approach to infer the ECB’s actual decision-making 
mechanism from its past decisions. The idea is to estimate national Taylor rules using 
historical data so as to produce counterfactual national interest-rate paths and an interest-rate 
path that would be followed by a policymaker concerned only with the euro area. These 
counterfactual interest-rate paths are then aggregated using different decision procedures and 
various assumptions as to preferences of members of the Governing Council to produce 
hypothetical interest rates that can be compared to the historical interest rates set by the 
Governing Council. We consider four important decision procedures: (i) full chairman 
dominance, (ii) one man, one vote, (iii) several versions of bargaining, and (iv) the agenda-
setting power of the president, under different assumptions about the behaviour of Executive 
Board members. We also consider two alternative types of preferences of the members of the 
Governing Council: (i) ‘federal’ preferences, whereby council members seek to implement 6 
 
policies that best suit the euro area as a whole, (ii) ‘national’ preferences, if they seek to 
implement policies that best suit their country of origin. By comparing the fit of hypothetical 
interest rates to observed ones, we can determine the decision rule that best describes the 
ECB’s decisions. 
We contribute to the literature on monetary policy committees by testing whether de 
jure decision rules are applied de facto, as we test the official one-man–one-vote rule found in 
the ECB’s statutes. Moreover, our results contribute to our knowledge of monetary policy 
making in a monetary union. By testing whether members of the Governing Council pursue 
national or federal objectives, we check the validity of the assumption made in the theoretical 
literature on decision rules in monetary unions that governors act as representatives of their 
country’s interest.  Grüner (1999) showed that the welfare effect of monetary integration 
depended on the federal or national orientation of central bankers. Moreover, we assess the 
extent to which the provision of the Maastricht Treaty mandating that members of the 
Governing Council set monetary policy designed for the needs of the euro area as a whole is 
implemented in practice. This bears on the theory of policy making in the European Union in 
particular, and, more generally, in federations and in international organisations. Finally, we 
also contribute to the policy debate on the nationality of Governing Council members of the 
ECB, which recently came back to the fore with the appointment of Mario Draghi instead of 
Axel Weber as president of the ECB. If members of the Governing Council pursued strictly 
federal objectives, then their nationality would be irrelevant. 
Our results show that of all the scenarios we consider, the best-performing is the one 
in which individual members follow national objectives, bargain over the interest rate, and 
their weights in the negotiation are based on their country’s share of the zone’s GDP. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the 
econometric strategy used to produce counterfactual national interest rates, and the various 
decision rules applied to aggregate national rates. The third section contains a discussion of 




2. Reaction functions 
It is now common to operationalise monetary policy actions using the short-term interest rate. 
This variable is both easy to obtain and perceived to be the main policy instrument of central 
banks (Borio, 1997). Taylor’s (1993) attempt to describe interest-rate setting in terms of a 
monetary policy reaction function has been widely adopted. In a ‘Taylor rule’, the short-term 
nominal interest rate, representing the central bank’s monetary policy instrument, responds to 
deviations in inflation and output from their target levels. The first step in our analysis is the 
construction  of  counterfactual Taylor rules for the EMU member countries. The central 
bank’s target level for short-term nominal interest rates is modelled as a function of the 






*+ β (πt+k − π
*) + γ yt               (1) 
with i
T denoting the target nominal interest rate, r* the long-run real interest rate, y the output 
gap, π the inflation rate, π
* the target inflation rate, β the inflation weight in the target interest 
rate, γ the output weight in the target interest rate, and k the number of periods policymakers 
look ahead. 
By estimating historical Taylor rules, we determine the relative weights of inflation 
and the output gap in each country’s reaction function, and implicitly assume that those 
weights are constant over time. However, we allow those parameters to vary across countries 
so that different countries may weigh the two objectives differently. 
It is well known that empirical Taylor rule estimates tend to be sensitive to differences 
in specification and sampling. Therefore, instead of relying on just one particular study, we 
take an arithmetic average over three reasonable specifications of the Taylor rule. In terms of 
empirical Taylor rule estimates, we use two comparative studies by Eleftheriou et al. (2006) 
and Hayo (2007) that cover the EMU countries and apply a comparable methodology across 
countries. In Hayo (2007), all national Taylor rules are estimated with a one-year forward-
looking horizon for the inflation rate; Eleftheriou et al. (2006) maximise the fit of the Taylor 8 
 
rule to the actual interest-rate series.
1
Due to changes in the real rate of interest, the national Taylor rules contain estimated 
constant terms (α) that deviate substantially from the one estimated for the ECB Taylor rule in 
Hayo and Hofmann (2006). From Equation (1) it follows that the constant α of the target 
interest rate is: 
 As a third type of Taylor rule, we apply Taylor’s (1993) 
original rule, which has become a sort of benchmark in the literature. The one-year forward-
looking  reaction function  for the euro area as a whole is  taken  from Hayo and 
Hofmann (2006). 
  α = r
* + (1 − β) π
*                 (2) 
To compensate for changes over time, we derive the implied long-run real interest rate 
by rearranging Equation (2) and replacing the national estimates of the long-run interest rates 
obtained from Eleftheriou et al. (2006) and Hayo (2007) with value estimated for the EMU 
period: 
  r
* = α − (1 − β) π
*                 (3) 
In the analysis below, we use counterfactual national target-rate series based on the 
long-run coefficients β, γ, and adjusted α, and then construct simple arithmetic averages. We 
interpret the final series as indicators of how national interest rates would have been set in the 
absence of the EMU. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows these counterfactual interest-rate 





                                                 
1 Eleftheriou et al. (2006) estimate Taylor rules for the period 1993 to 1998, whereas Hayo (2007) investigates 
data from 1979 to 1998. In both studies, general method of moments (GMM) estimators are applied to monthly 
national series. 
2 In general, our simulated interest rate paths tend to be above the EONIA. This finding is also true for the euro 
area rule estimated by Hayo and Hofmann (2006), which would have predicted higher European interest rates. 
This may be the European version of what Taylor (2009) criticised as a deviation of actual monetary policy from 
some sort of interest rate rule, leading to worldwide excess liquidity.  9 
 
3. Decision rules and scenarios 
We consider five types of decision rules, each of which can be adapted to various institutional 
settings: consensus, voting, bargaining, full chairman dominance, and voting with a chairman. 
In various scenarios, we apply these decision rules to particular sets of objectives. Such 
objectives will be referred to as ‘federal’ if council members seek to implement monetary 
policies that best suit the euro area as a whole, and as ‘national’ if they seek to implement 
policies that are optimal for their country of origin. 
3.1. Voting 
According to Article 105 of the Constitution of the European System of Central Banks and of 
the European Central Bank, voting is the Governing Council’s official decision rule for our 
period of study. Moreover, Article 105 mandates that the same weight be given to each 
member’s vote—the one-man–one-vote rule. How this rule works in a monetary union has 
been investigated frequently since von Hagen and Süppel’s (1994) seminal contribution. 
As the Governing Council’s decision has a single dimension,  the median voter 
theorem applies. Accordingly, the interest rate set by the council under voting is the median of 
interest rates favoured by its members.
3
We complement the official voting rule by two institutional settings in which only a 
subset of Governing Council members can vote. In the first scenario, only national governors 
vote, which reflects the intergovernmental design of the European Council. In this scenario, 
the chosen interest rate corresponds to the interest rate preferred by the median governor. In 
the second scenario, only members of the Executive Board are allowed to vote; here, the 
chosen interest rate will be the one favoured by the median board member. 
 
3.2. Consensus 
Consensus is the Governing Council’s official decision-making mechanism. To model it, we 
follow Austen-Smith and Banks (2005, chapter 4) and Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010) in 
                                                 
3 Note that Greece has been a member of the Governing Council only since January 2001, which increased the 
size of the council to 18 members. 10 
 
assuming that decisions are made in a two-stage process. In the first stage, the Governing 
Council determines, by a simple majority vote, whether the interest rate should be increased 
or decreased with respect to the status quo. Based on the first-stage decision, the council next, 
based on supermajority, moves the interest rate up or down in a series of votes for or against 
incremental changes in the rate. 
Based on the national Taylor rules, we arrive at a distribution of preferred interest-rate 
targets  j , T
t i , j = 1, ..., 17 (or 18, when Greece is included). Let  M
t i denote the median of this 
distribution, and  K
t i − 100  (respectively,  K




t t i i − = 100
  K  thereby measures the size of the supermajority needed to reach a 
conclusion. Then, the outcomes are as in Equations (4a) to (4c): 
    if  K
t t i i −
− < 100
1              (4a) 
1 − = t t i i     if  K
t t
K
t i i i ≤ ≤ −
−
1
100            (4b) 
K
t t i i =     if 
K M
t t i i
+
− > 1              (4c) 
The logic behind this is simple: in Equation (4a), the previous interest rate is smaller 
than preferred by more than K% of voting members. Hence, council members will decide to 
raise interest rates until the interest rate  K M
t i −  is reached. Afterward, less than the required 
supermajority still believes the interest rate is too low; hence, no further increases will be 
made. Equation (4c) is analogous, whereas it is evident that in Equation (4b) the required 
supermajority cannot be reached to either raise or decrease interest rates. 
To apply the consensus rule, one must specify the size of the supermajority required to 
change the interest rate in the second stage of the decision process, that is, the value of K. 
Based on the fact that many countries use a two-thirds majority rule to decide important 
issues, we here assume that two-thirds of the council must support a decision for it to pass. 
This assumption is further supported by Caplin and Nalebuff (1988, 1991), who show that a 
66% majority always avoids cycling on multidimensional decisions. Although the decision 
                                                 
4 The interested reader will find a formal demonstration of the outcome of the consensus rule in Riboni and 
Ruge-Murcia (2010). 11 
 
considered here is unidimensional, in ‘real life’, the Governing Council may have to make 
multidimensional decisions. For instance, when offering variable rate tenders in the main 
refinancing operations of the ECB, both minimum bid rate as well as volume of allocated 
liquidity need to be fixed. In such a case, imposing a 66% majority guarantees that the council 
will be able to make a decision. 
3.3. Bargaining 
We model the outcome of a bargaining process by computing the weighted average of the 
interest rates favoured by individual members of the Governing Council. We consider two 
distributions of bargaining power, corresponding to different weighting mechanisms. In the 
first distribution, all members are given equal weight. In the second, members are weighted 
based on their country’s share of the zone’s GDP.
5
3.4. The president: Full dominance and agenda setting 
 One should note that those weighting 
schemes are not tantamount to maximising an aggregate welfare function for the euro area. 
Maximising aggregate euro area  welfare would result in averaging national interest rates 
weighted by GDPs. In our approach, reflecting the ECB’s institutional design, the preferred 
interest rates of the countries that are represented in the Executive Board are over-weighted. 
The first, and simplest, way to model the role played by the ECB president is to assume that 
he has complete discretion in setting the interest rate. Although simple, this is not completely 
unrealistic; for example, some accounts of Alan Greenspan’s chairmanship at the Fed suggest 
that he was influential enough to almost always impose his view on the FOMC (Gerlach-
Kristen and Meade, 2010). Hence, modelling president full dominance consists in assuming 
that the Governing Council always decides in favour of the chairman’s preferred interest rate. 
                                                 
5 In the cases of national Executive Board members, we weigh the optimal interest rate of each Board member 
by the GDP of his/her country of origin. The latter countries’ interest rate weight then receives a double weight. 
In the cases where Executive Board members are assumed federalist, we (i) compute a GDP-weighted average of 
the interest rates of the countries that are represented in the Executive Board, then (ii) compute a GDP-weighted 
average of the interest rates of the euro area member countries, and finally (iii) average the two using a 6/17 and 
11/17 distribution. 12 
 
Another way to model the president’s role is to follow Montoro (2007), Farvaque et 
al. (2009), and Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010), and assume that the ECB president is an 
agenda setter. This assumption is in line with Pollard’s (2003) argument that the role of the 
ECB president is, indeed, to set the agenda. One interpretation of agenda-setting power is to 
assume that the president’s role is to put to a vote a given value of the interest rate. By 
majority vote, the council then chooses between this interest rate and the previous period’s 
interest rate. 
In such an agenda-setting framework, the president announces the interest rate closest 
to the one he favours under the constraint that a majority of the council will vote for it. In 
other words, from the set of interest rates preferred to the status quo by the median voter on 
the council, the president puts to the vote the one closest to his own preferences.  This 
framework can accommodate both federalist and nationalist preferences, but we can remain 
general at this point. The exact definition of the president’s and other members’ optimal 
interest rates will be specified below for each scenario. 
Let 
P
t i  denote the president’s optimal interest rate, 
M
t i , the median council member’s 
optimal interest rate,  1 − t i   the current interest rate, and  t i   the new interest rate.  Then the 
outcome of the decision problem will be: 








t i i i ≥ ≥ −1     (5a) 
1 2 − − = t
M












t i i i i > ≥ − −1 2    (5b) 
P
t t i i =    otherwise                 (5c) 
In the first case (Equation (5a)), the president’s optimal interest rate and the median 
voter’s optimal interest rate lie on opposite sides of the current interest rate. In such a case, the 
median voter has no incentive to vote for an interest rate that is closer to the president’s 
optimum than the current interest rate. Conversely, the president has no incentive to put to a 
vote an interest rate that is closer to the median member’s optimum than the current interest 
rate. Hence, this configuration preserves the status quo, i.e., the interest rate remains 
unchanged. 13 
 
In the second case (Equation (5b)), the previous interest rate is lower than the median 
voter’s optimum but close to it. More precisely, the difference between the previous interest 
rate and the median voter’s favourite interest rate is smaller than the distance between the 
median voter’s interest rate and the chairman’s favourite interest rate. The best the president 
can achieve is to announce the interest rate that makes the median council member indifferent 
between that interest rate and the status quo. This interest rate is equal to the median voter’s 
interest rate plus the difference between the median voter’s interest rate and the previous 
interest rate. 
The third configuration (Equation (5c)) appears when the past interest rate is far 
enough from the median voter’s optimum so that the median member prefers the president’s 
optimal interest rate to the status quo. The chairman is then able to impose his optimal interest 
rate. 
3.5. Objectives 
The ECB’s official stance is that members of the Governing Council should not act as 
national representatives, but work to implement a policy that meets the needs of the euro area 
as a whole. It is at least plausible that members of the Executive Board will, indeed, act in this 
manner because they are appointed following a procedure involving all EMU member 
countries. According to Article 11.2 of the statutes of the European System of Central Banks 
and of the European Central Bank, members of the Executive Board are appointed by 
‘common accord of the governments of the Member States at the level of the Heads of State 
or Government, on a recommendation from the Council after it has consulted the European 
Parliament and the Governing Council’. Thus, as they are appointed at the EMU level, they 
are presumed to pursue euro-zone-wide objectives. 
However, there is no guarantee that they will. First, they have national backgrounds, 
and may have particular ties with their country of origin. One way to avoid national biases 
would be to employ EMU outsiders as members of the council. Currently, this possibility is 
explicitly ruled out by Article 11.2 of the statutes of the European System of Central Banks 
and of the European Central Bank, which states that ‘only nationals of Member States may be 14 
 
members of the Executive Board’.
6
What objectives board members actually pursue is an empirical matter and is 
addressed below. We consider various combinations of the two assumptions about member 
behaviour and determine which one produces the outcome that best fits the observed ECB 
decisions. We do not consider a scenario in which the Executive Board is nationalist while 
national governors are federalist, as the former are appointed at the federal level and work in 
Frankfurt, while the latter are appointed nationally and work in their home country. 
 Moreover, if regional representatives of the FOMC are 
sensitive to the condition of their home region, as Gildea (1992), Meade and Sheets (2005), 
Chappell et al. (2008), and Hayo and Neuenkirch (2011) report, it is plausible that the same 
applies to members of the ECB’s Governing Council. As governors of national central banks 
are directly appointed by their home government, they are even more likely than members of 
the Executive Board to pursue national objectives. 
That both the governors and the members of the Executive Board follow federal 
objectives cannot be ruled out a priori. This  eventuality would result in a systematic 
consensus about setting the interest rate to the level that is optimal for the euro area. 
Accordingly, decision rules would be irrelevant, as all configurations would lead to the same 
policy. We therefore use this scenario, referred to as ‘full federalism’, as our benchmark 
case.
7
When modelling simple voting, we consider that national governors always act as 
representatives of their country of origin. In other words, we assume that they behave as 
nationalists. As regards the Executive Board members, we consider two contrasting scenarios: 
 
                                                 
6 The names and nationality of the members of the Executive Board are listed in the Appendix. In theory, the 
Executive Board could be a mix of federalist and nationalist members. To save on space, we do not consider that 
possibility here. 
7 An alternative definition of full federalism would be to weigh national interest rates by GDP, regardless of the 
country of origin of the members of the Governing Council. Gros and Hefeker (2002) argue that such a rule 
could be optimal. We leave this alternative aside, because it would mix positive and normative arguments. Here, 
we are only concerned with providing a positive analysis, which, of course, does not imply that a normative 
analysis would be without merit. 15 
 
one in which they all act as national representatives and one in which they all embrace a 
federal point of view. 
When voting is restricted to governors, we assume that they are nationalists. When it is 
restricted to the Executive Board, we only consider the possibility that the board is nationalist. 
In both cases, the alternative scenario, that is, where governors or Executive Board members 
are federalist, would simply replicate the interest-rate path determined by the euro-wide 
Taylor rule. 
In bargaining scenarios, we allow board members to be either nationalist or federalist 
for each distribution of bargaining power, whereas governors are assumed to always behave 
nationalistically. 
In the scenario in which the president has full discretion over interest rates, we assume 
that he may be either federalist, which results in the federal rule being implemented, or 
nationalist. In the latter case, the chosen interest rate is the interest rate favoured by the 
Netherlands during Wim Duisenberg’s mandate and the one preferred by France during Jean-
Claude Trichet’s. If the president is assumed to act as an agenda setter, we assume that all 
governors are nationalists, and let the Executive Board, including the president, behave in 
either a nationalist or federalist manner. 
We consider 13 alternative scenarios. The next section investigates how well these 
scenarios mimic actual development of the European interest rate. 
 
4. Findings 
Graphical representations of each scenario together with the evolution of the Eonia can be 
found in the Appendix (Figure A2) over the period January 1999 to December 2006. They 
show that the period of study allows testing the capacity of each scenario to reproduce periods 
of stability of the interest rate, such as 2003-2005, but also sudden policy reversals, such as 
the reversal from a series of interest rate increases to a succession of interest rate cuts that 
occurred in 2001. 
Table 1 displays the summary statistics of the interest rates produced by each scenario. 
The means of all simulated interest rates are larger than the Eonia average. Moreover, the 16 
 
difference is significant at any standard level of confidence. On average, the ECB was 
therefore less hawkish than expected by our counterfactuals. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Decision rule  Preferences  Mean  Standard deviation 
Eonia  Eonia  2.98  0.91 
Full federalism  Federalist governors and 
federalist board 
3.91  0.72 
Chairman dominance  Nationalist chairman 
 
4.70  2.37 
One member one vote  Nationalist governors and 
nationalist board 
4.07  1.03 
One member one vote  Nationalist governors and 
federalist board 
3.95  0.72 
Restricted: One governor 
one vote 
Nationalist governors  4.05  1.06 
Restricted: One member 
of the board one vote 
Nationalist board  4.07  1.01 
Consensus  Nationalist governors and 
nationalist board 
4.30  0.98 
Consensus  Nationalist governors and 
federalist board 
3.86  0.78 
Bargaining equal weights  Nationalist governors and 
nationalist board 
4.25  1.02 
Bargaining equal weights  Nationalist governors and 
federalist board 
3.83  0.79 
Bargaining GDP weights  Nationalist governors and 
nationalist board 
3.77  0.89 
Bargaining GDP weights  Nationalist governors and 
federalist board 
3.83  0.78 
Chairman  Nationalist governors and 
nationalist board 
4.40  1.57 
Chairman  Nationalist governors and 
federalist board 
3.92  0.73 
 
Nevertheless, ordering scenarios by decreasing interest-rate averages leads to a fairly 
consistent ranking. The scenario that generates the average interest rate closest to Eonia is the 
bargaining scenario in which governors and board members are all nationalist, and their 
weight in the negotiations is based on their country’s relative GDP size. The two bargaining 
scenarios in which governors are nationalist and the board federalist generate the next closest 17 
 
match of interest rates. The two scenarios producing the largest interest rates are the ones 
where the chairman is nationalist. 
In our sample, a scenario’s capacity to reproduce the volatility of the observed interest 
rate is a more discriminatory criterion, as our simulations produce very different standard 
deviations of the interest rate. Indeed, five scenarios produce standard deviations that are not 
statistically distinguishable from the standard deviation of the  observed interest rate: 
bargaining with GDP weights, national representatives and national governors; consensus 
with national representatives and national governors; voting restricted to a nationalist 
executive board; bargaining with equal weights, national representatives and national 
governors; and voting with national representatives and national governors. Six scenarios 
produce a lower than observed volatility of the interest rate: full federalism; voting with 
nationalist governors and a federalist board; a federalist chairman facing nationalist governors 
and a federalist board; bargaining with GDP weights, nationalist governors, and federalist 
board; consensus with nationalist governors and federalist board; and bargaining with equal 
weights, nationalist governors, and a federalist board. The two scenarios involving a 
nationalist chairman stand out as producing the largest volatilities. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
volatility of the simulated interest rate is particularly high in the scenario where a single, 
unchecked nationalist chairman sets the interest rate. 
Table 2 complements Table 1 by providing three selection criteria for each scenario: 
root mean square error (RMSE), mean average error (MAE), and the deviation of first-order 
serial correlation of simulated interest-rate paths from Eonia’s (AC). The RMSE criterion and 
MAE criterion are based on selecting the scenarios that best describe the Eonia interest-rate 
series, which we believe to be a natural and important selection criterion. The AC criterion 
assesses whether the autocorrelation of simulated interest-rate paths is close to Eonia’s first-
order serial correlation coefficient, which exceeds 0.988. Given the high degree of persistence 
observed for Eonia, it could be argued that a scenario’s capacity to generate autocorrelation is 
a desirable property. In our view, this criterion should be considered with caution in the 
present context because it weighs heavily a scenario’s capacity to produce gridlock, regardless 
of its capacity to accurately predict the Eonia. Therefore, a scenario may perform well simply 18 
 
because it generates long periods of status quo, while, when they finally do occur, 
inaccurately predicting the magnitude of changes in the interest rate. 
RMSE and MAE select the same three best-performing scenarios, which are all 
bargaining scenarios. Bargaining with GDP weights where governors and members of the 
Executive Board are nationalist leads to the smallest RMSE and MAE. That scenario 
outperforms the two bargaining scenarios where governors are nationalist and members of the 
board are federalist, which yields similar results regardless of the applied weighting scheme. 
All three lead to RMSEs and MAEs smaller than 1, which implies that the average error is 
below 1 percentage point. The consensus scenario in which the Executive Board is assumed to 
be federalist also produces a RMSE and a MAE that are lower than 1, and therefore ranks 
fourth according to both scenarios. 
 19 
 
Table 2: Selection criteria 
Decision rule  Preferences  RMSE  MAE  AC 
Full federalism  Federalist governors and 
federalist board 
1.25  1.04  0.288 
Chairman dominance  Nationalist chairman 
 
2.36  1.85  0.034 
One member one vote  Nationalist governors and 
nationalist board 
1.22  1.13  0.053 
One member one vote  Nationalist governors and 
federalist board 
1.23  1.04  0.226 
Restricted: One governor 
one vote 
Nationalist governors  1.20  1.11  0.043 
Restricted: One member 
of the board one vote 
Nationalist board  1.20  1.12  0.044 
Consensus  Nationalist governors and 
nationalist board 
1.96  1.33  0.010 
Consensus  Nationalist governors and 
federalist board 
1.05  0.93  0.044 
Bargaining equal weights  Nationalist governors and 
nationalist board 
1.34  1.29  0.032 
Bargaining equal weights  Nationalist governors and 
federalist board 
0.99  0.90  0.064 
Bargaining GDP weights  Nationalist governors and 
nationalist board 
0.91  0.86  0.028 
Bargaining GDP weights  Nationalist governors and 
federalist board 
0.99  0.91  0.068 
Chairman  Nationalist governors and 
nationalist board 
1.68  1.43  0.028 
Chairman  Nationalist governors and 
federalist board 
1.23  1.04  0.247 
 
The RMSE and MAE criteria also concur in selecting the same worst three scenarios, 
although in different orders. According to both criteria, the worst scenario is chairman 
dominance when the chairman is nationalist, which leads to a RMSE of 2.36 and an MAE of 
1.85. The consensus scenario with a nationalist Executive Board and nationalist governors is 
next to last according to the RMSE criterion, and second to last according to the MAE 
criterion. It produces a RMSE of 1.96 and a MAE of 1.33. With a RMSE of 1.68 and a MAE 
of 1.43, the scenario in which a nationalist chairman faces a nationalist council is ranked 
second to last according to the MAE criterion and third to last according to the RMSE 
criterion. Thus, the best  and the worst-performing scenarios in our simulations are not 
affected by outliers, which only have some effect on the ranking of scenarios in between. 20 
 
The last column of Table 2 (AC) shows the deviation of the estimated first-order 
autocorrelations implied by each scenario from that of actual interest rates. The table reveals 
that Eonia shows greater persistence than any interest-rate series produced by the scenarios 
under consideration. Reflecting the caveat about the usefulness of this criterion mentioned 
above, the scenario that most likely produces a gridlock—the consensus scenario in which 
where all members of the council are assumed nationalist—performs best, with a coefficient 
of autocorrelation that is very close to Eonia’s. It is closely followed by  the Chairman 
scenario with nationalist governors and nationalist board member, which also produces 
gridlocks. The bargaining scenario in which members of the council are nationalist and have 
equal bargaining power, the chairman dominance scenario, and the bargaining scenario in 
which members of the council are nationalist and bargaining powers are determined by GDP 
also come close. The three worst-performing scenarios by far are: full federalism, a federalist 
chairman facing nationalist governors and a federal board, and the scenario where nationalist 
governors and a federal board vote.
8
Table 3 displays the results of the regressions where the actual interest rate is 
regressed on the simulated interest rate. At least three criteria can be used to compare the 
accuracy of a given scenario: large R-squared (R-squared criterion), constant term equal to 
zero (Abs. const. criterion), and slope coefficient equal to unity (slope criterion). The first 
criterion is the overall fit of each regression as measured by its R-squared. According to that 
criterion, the scenario that performs best is one in which members of the council are all 
  The poor performance of the scenario in which a 
federalist chairman faces nationalist governors and a federal board may seem initially 
surprising, because the chairman model can relatively easily produce gridlock. However, it 
can be explained by recalling that gridlocks occur in that model when the chairman and the 
board stand on opposite sides of the status quo. When the chairman is federalist, he prefers an 
interest rate that must, by construction, lie in the middle of the governors’ preferred interest 
rates. The likelihood of a gridlock is therefore small, which, in our context, generates low 
interest-rate persistence. 
                                                 
8 These three scenarios produce first-order autocorrelation parameters that are significantly lower than Eonia’s at 
a 1% level. 21 
 
nationalist and  they set the interest weight by bargaining with equal weights. This one-
national-member–one-weight rule explains more than 80% of the observed variance of the 
euro area’s interest rate. At the other extreme, three scenarios stand out for their very low R-
squareds. The worst-performing scenario is the full federalist scenario, with an R-squared of 
25%. This is a very interesting finding, as it stands in stark contrast to the official position of 
the ECB, which is that members of the board set interest rates based on the evolution of the 
euro area as a whole. Other badly performing scenarios are: a federalist chairman setting the 
agenda for a federalist board and nationalist governors, and voting when the executive board 
is federalist and the governors are nationalist. The former’s R-squared does not exceed 30%, 




Table 3: Regression results 
Decision rule  Preferences  Simulated 
interest rate 
Constant  R
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0.719  F(1,94) = 
34*** 
Restricted: One 
member of the 








0.753  F(1,94) = 
23*** 









0.765  F(1,94) = 
18*** 
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0.768  F(1,94) = 
300*** 








0.299  F(1,94) = 
8,68*** 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at a level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; t-values in parentheses. 
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The second criterion is the value of the estimated constant. A scenario exactly 
replicating the observed interest rate should result in an estimated constant equal to zero. Six 
scenarios perform well according to this criterion because their estimated constant is not 
distinguishable from zero at standard levels of significance: Voting restricted to a nationalist 
Executive Board, unrestricted voting when all board members are nationalist, voting restricted 
to nationalist governors, unrestricted voting when governors are nationalist and members of 
the board are federalist, a federalist chairman with a federalist board and nationalist 
governors, and full federalism. In the latter scenario, however, the estimated constant is large, 
its insignificance being due to a high standard error.
9
The four scenarios involving bargaining result in constants that are significantly 
negative, implying that the scenarios, on average, tend to overshoot the interest rate. It 
therefore appears that bargaining scenarios tend to overestimate the average interest rate 
regardless of the hypotheses made about the preferences of the members of the ECB’s 
Governing Council, and the same is true for both consensus scenarios. 
 
Finally, assuming that a fully dominant federalist chairman is an agenda setter in a 
council where members of the Executive Board are federalist and governors are nationalist, 
results in a constant that is significantly positive at the 1% level of significance. Those 
scenarios therefore tend to undershoot the actual interest rate. However, this outcome appears 
to be largely due to the fact that France requested a lower interest rate than other member 
countries. 
Our favourite criterion of this group is the size of the coefficient of the estimated 
interest rate because it measures the relationship between a 1 percentage point change in the 
simulated interest rate and the corresponding change in the real-world rate. A perfect 
simulation should generate a coefficient equal to 1. However, we find that all estimated 
coefficients are smaller than 1, suggesting that the ECB’s behaviour is more cautious than any 
of our simulations imply. Nevertheless, marked differences between various scenarios appear 
and, in the case of three scenarios, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is 
                                                 
9 The residuals of the models in Table 3 show evidence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. However, 
employing Newey-West robust standard errors does not change our conclusions. 24 
 
statistically equal to unity at any reasonable level of significance: Bargaining with equal 
weights when governors are nationalist and members of the Executive Board are federalist 
leads to the highest coefficient (0.956). This scenario is closely followed by the one where 
nationalist governors and federalist members of the Executive Board bargain using GDP 
weights, with a coefficient of 0.955. The consensus scenario in which members of the board 
are federalist and the governors are nationalist comes close, with a coefficient equal to 0.952. 
The two bargaining scenarios in which all members of the Governing Council are 
nationalist produce coefficients that exceed 0.8, although the scenario assuming GDP weights 
instead of equal weights performs better, with a coefficient of 0.896 instead of 0.801. 
Between them is the consensus scenario in which the entire council is nationalist, which 
produces a coefficient of 0.805. 
Next in line, performance-wise, are the four scenarios in which members of the 
Governing Council are assumed to vote, which show coefficients ranging from 0.728 to 
0.779. The three following scenarios are those involving a chairman and the full federalist 
scenario. Finally, the scenario producing the smallest coefficient is that of full chairman 
dominance. This is intuitively plausible, as, by construction, the situation of any single 
country is more volatile than that of the whole euro area. 
A sorting of the rankings of the ECB Governing Council decision-making scenarios 
according to the various criteria is presented in Table 4. In general, comparing the 
performance of different scenarios suggests that the ranking of most decision rules is robust to 
the assumed preferences of the members of the Executive Board. A tentative interpretation of 
this finding could be that the economic situation in the home countries of the Executive Board 
members is somewhat similar to that of the euro area as a whole. 
Looking at the best-performing scenario across the eight criteria reveals a clear 
winner—the scenario in which members of the council bargain, are all nationalists, and have 
bargaining power reflecting the size of their country in the euro area’s GDP. Not only does 
this scenario have the best arithmetic average and median ranking across all the criteria, it is 
ranked first by four of those criteria: it produces an average interest rate and a standard 
deviation that are the closest to the Eonia’s, and shows a high fit as demonstrated by its low 
RMSE and MAE values. Furthermore, it performs well according to three other criteria, as it 25 
 
ranks third in terms of R-squared in bivariate regressions and fourth in terms of the slope 
coefficient. With a rank of 5, it performs better than expected according to the autocorrelation 
criterion, as it clearly outperforms one consensus scenario and one chairman scenario. Table 4 
also shows that the scenario’s median ranking is the best in our set of scenarios  and  it 
performs well quite consistently, as it has the lowest standard deviation with respect to the 
various rankings. 
In terms of average and median ranking, the bargaining scenario with equal weights, 
national governors, and a federalist board performs second best. It ranks first according to the 
slope coefficient in a regression of this scenario’s interest-rate path on Eonia, second in 
respect to both RMSE and MAE, third with regard to its average being close to Eonia’s, and 
fifth in terms of matching Eonia’s standard deviation. However, compared to the bargaining 
scenario with GDP weights that assumes only national preferences, it shows not only a higher 
average and median ranking but also less consistency across the different criteria, as can be 
seen from the much higher standard deviation in the last column of Table 4. 
The third-best-performing simulation is yet another bargaining scenario, this time 
assuming  GDP  weights of Governing Council members, nationalist governors, and a 
federalist Executive Board. This scenario performs second  best in terms of the slope 
coefficient close to 1 in a regression of its interest-rate path on Eonia, comes second with 
regard to its average interest rate, and it reaches third rank according to RMSE and MAE. 
Both in terms of mean ranking as well as consistency across different criteria, however, it 
clearly lags behind the bargaining scenario that assumes nationalist behaviour throughout. In 
terms of median ranking, it is equal to the consensus scenario with nationalist governors and a 







Table 4: Summary of the ranking of scenarios 
































































































Full federalism  Federalist governors and 
federalist board 
5  11  10  7  14  12  9  14  10.3  10.5  3.2 
Chairman dominance  Nationalist chairman  14  14  14  14  4  14  14  2  11.3  14.0  5.1 
One member one vote  Nationalist governors 
and nationalist board 
10  6  7  10  9  8  2  8  7.5  8.0  2.6 
One member one vote  Nationalist governors 
and federalist board 
7  12  8  5  12  9  3  12  8.5  8.5  3.4 
Restricted: One governor one 
vote 
Nationalist governors  8  9  5  8  7  10  1  7  6.9  7.5  2.8 
Restricted: One member of the 
board one vote 
Nationalist board  9  3  6  9  8  7  4  6  6.5  6.5  2.2 
Consensus  Nationalist governors 
and nationalist board 
12  2  13  12  1  5  8  5  7.3  6.5  4.7 
Consensus  Nationalist governors 
and federalist board 
4  8  4  4  6  3  12  11  6.5  5.0  3.5 
Bargaining equal weights  Nationalist governors 
and nationalist board 
11  4  11  11  3  6  7  1  6.8  6.5  4.0 
Bargaining equal weights  Nationalist governors 
and federalist board 
3  5  2  2  10  1  11  9  5.4  4.0  4.0 
Bargaining GDP weights  Nationalist governors 
and nationalist board 
1  1  1  1  5  4  6  3  2.8  2.0  2.1 
Bargaining GDP weights  Nationalist governors 
and federalist board 
2  7  3  3  11  2  10  10  6.0  5.0  4.0 
Chairman  Nationalist governors 
and nationalist board 
13  13  12  13  2  13  13  4  10.4  13.0  4.6 
Chairman  Nationalist governors 
and federalist board 




In this paper, we inquire into how the ECB makes monetary policy decisions for the euro 
area. Given that there is no public information about how the ECB Governing Council makes 
decisions, we rely on a set of counterfactuals. Using Taylor rules estimated for the pre-euro 
period, we derive 13 interest-rate scenarios that vary with respect to the underlying decision 
rules and the assumed preferences of the members of the Governing Council. Five types of 
rules are considered: voting, consensus, bargaining, full chairman dominance, and voting with 
a chairman. We apply these rules to three sets of assumed preferences: a fully federalist 
Governing Council, a federalist Executive Board facing national governors in the Governing 
Council, and a fully nationalist Governing Council. Using a series of criteria, we assess how 
well each of the scenarios matches Eonia. Four main conclusions can be drawn. 
First, the scenario that performs best is the one in which individual members of the 
Governing Council follow national objectives and bargain over interest-rate setting based on 
weights derived from their country’s share in the euro area’s GDP. This scenario produces a 
mean interest rate closest to the average of Eonia, with the lowest standard deviation around 
that mean. It also generates the smallest prediction errors measured by both RMSE and MAE. 
It even outperforms, in terms of its capacity to reproduce the observed interest rate’s 
persistence, scenarios that yield periods of status quo. 
Second, scenarios in which it is assumed that the members of the Governing Council 
bargain over interest rates generally perform better than scenarios in which it is assumed that 
decisions are made by consensus or by using various voting rules. This finding reveals that 
actual behaviour does not match that mandated in the ECB statutes, which stipulate that the 
Governing Council should make its decisions using a simple majority vote. The finding also 
throws some doubt on the credibility of the ECB’s official position that all its decisions are 
based on consensus. 
Third, scenarios in which the ECB president plays a key role generally perform 
poorly. These scenarios are especially outperformed by scenarios assuming collective 
decision-making procedures, whether by way of bargaining or through consensus. 28 
 
Finally, scenarios in which all members of the Governing Council are assumed to 
pursue Euro-area-wide objectives are dominated by scenarios in which decisions are made 
collectively by a council consisting, at least partly, of members pursuing national objectives. 
This finding is also at odds with the ECB’s official mandate that members of the Governing 
Council are to implement policies that best meet the needs of the euro area as a whole. It is, 
however, in line with previous studies that have unveiled regional influences in the United 
States as well as in the euro area. 
In this paper, our sole aim was to discover how decisions are actually made in the 
Governing Council. A promising avenue for extending this research would be to determine 
whether the ECB’s decision-making process changes when membership in the EU increases, 
as well as the effect of the rotating rule, when (or if) it becomes applicable. Another fruitful 
avenue for future research would be to derive the normative implications of the decision 
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Table A1: Nationalities and identities of the members of the Executive Board 
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